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@@ -0,0 +1,840 @@
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+/*
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+ * Copyright 2015 Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
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+ *
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+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
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+ */
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+
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+#include <common.h>
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+#include <fsl_validate.h>
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+#include <fsl_secboot_err.h>
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+#include <fsl_sfp.h>
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+#include <fsl_sec.h>
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+#include <command.h>
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+#include <malloc.h>
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+#include <dm/uclass.h>
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+#include <u-boot/rsa-mod-exp.h>
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+#include <hash.h>
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+#include <fsl_secboot_err.h>
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+#ifndef CONFIG_MPC85xx
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+#include <asm/arch/immap_ls102xa.h>
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+#endif
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+
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+#define SHA256_BITS 256
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+#define SHA256_BYTES (256/8)
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+#define SHA256_NIBBLES (256/4)
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+#define NUM_HEX_CHARS (sizeof(ulong) * 2)
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+
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+/* This array contains DER value for SHA-256 */
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+static const u8 hash_identifier[] = { 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60,
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+ 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00,
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+ 0x04, 0x20
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+ };
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+
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+static u8 hash_val[SHA256_BYTES];
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+static const u8 barker_code[ESBC_BARKER_LEN] = { 0x68, 0x39, 0x27, 0x81 };
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+
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+void branch_to_self(void) __attribute__ ((noreturn));
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+
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+/*
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+ * This function will put core in infinite loop.
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+ * This will be called when the ESBC can not proceed further due
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+ * to some unknown errors.
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+ */
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+void branch_to_self(void)
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+{
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+ printf("Core is in infinite loop due to errors.\n");
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+self:
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+ goto self;
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+}
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+
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+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
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+static u32 check_ie(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
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+{
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+ if (img->hdr.ie_flag)
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+ return 1;
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+/* This function returns the CSF Header Address of uboot
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+ * For MPC85xx based platforms, the LAW mapping for NOR
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+ * flash changes in uboot code. Hence the offset needs
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+ * to be calculated and added to the new NOR flash base
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+ * address
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+ */
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+#if defined(CONFIG_MPC85xx)
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+int get_csf_base_addr(ulong *csf_addr, ulong *flash_base_addr)
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+{
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+ struct ccsr_gur __iomem *gur = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_MPC85xx_GUTS_ADDR);
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+ u32 csf_hdr_addr = in_be32(&gur->scratchrw[0]);
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+ u32 csf_flash_offset = csf_hdr_addr & ~(CONFIG_SYS_PBI_FLASH_BASE);
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+ ulong flash_addr, addr;
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+ int found = 0;
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+ int i = 0;
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+
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+ for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_SYS_MAX_FLASH_BANKS; i++) {
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+ flash_addr = flash_info[i].start[0];
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+ addr = flash_info[i].start[0] + csf_flash_offset;
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+ if (memcmp((u8 *)addr, barker_code, ESBC_BARKER_LEN) == 0) {
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+ debug("Barker found on addr %lx\n", addr);
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+ found = 1;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if (!found)
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+ return -1;
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+
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+ *csf_addr = addr;
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+ *flash_base_addr = flash_addr;
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+#else
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+/* For platforms like LS1020, correct flash address is present in
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+ * the header. So the function reqturns flash base address as 0
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+ */
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+int get_csf_base_addr(ulong *csf_addr, ulong *flash_base_addr)
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+{
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+ struct ccsr_gur __iomem *gur = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_FSL_GUTS_ADDR);
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+ u32 csf_hdr_addr = in_be32(&gur->scratchrw[0]);
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+
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+ if (memcmp((u8 *)csf_hdr_addr, barker_code, ESBC_BARKER_LEN))
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+ return -1;
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+
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+ *csf_addr = csf_hdr_addr;
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+ *flash_base_addr = 0;
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+#endif
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+
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+static int get_ie_info_addr(ulong *ie_addr)
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+{
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+ struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *hdr;
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+ struct fsl_secboot_sg_table *sg_tbl;
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+ ulong flash_base_addr, csf_addr;
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+
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+ if (get_csf_base_addr(&csf_addr, &flash_base_addr))
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+ return -1;
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+
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+ hdr = (struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *)csf_addr;
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+
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+ /* For SoC's with Trust Architecture v1 with corenet bus
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+ * the sg table field in CSF header has absolute address
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+ * for sg table in memory. In other Trust Architecture,
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+ * this field specifies the offset of sg table from the
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+ * base address of CSF Header
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+ */
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+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_TRUST_ARCH_v1) && defined(CONFIG_FSL_CORENET)
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+ sg_tbl = (struct fsl_secboot_sg_table *)
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+ (((ulong)hdr->psgtable & ~(CONFIG_SYS_PBI_FLASH_BASE)) +
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+ flash_base_addr);
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+#else
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+ sg_tbl = (struct fsl_secboot_sg_table *)(csf_addr +
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+ (ulong)hdr->psgtable);
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+#endif
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+
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+ /* IE Key Table is the first entry in the SG Table */
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+#if defined(CONFIG_MPC85xx)
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+ *ie_addr = (sg_tbl->src_addr & ~(CONFIG_SYS_PBI_FLASH_BASE)) +
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+ flash_base_addr;
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+#else
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+ *ie_addr = sg_tbl->src_addr;
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+#endif
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+
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+ debug("IE Table address is %lx\n", *ie_addr);
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+#endif
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+
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+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
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+/* This function checks srk_table_flag in header and set/reset srk_flag.*/
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+static u32 check_srk(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
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+{
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+ if (img->hdr.len_kr.srk_table_flag & SRK_FLAG)
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+ return 1;
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+/* This function returns ospr's key_revoc values.*/
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+static u32 get_key_revoc(void)
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+{
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+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
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+ return (sfp_in32(&sfp_regs->ospr) & OSPR_KEY_REVOC_MASK) >>
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+ OSPR_KEY_REVOC_SHIFT;
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+}
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+
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+/* This function checks if selected key is revoked or not.*/
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+static u32 is_key_revoked(u32 keynum, u32 rev_flag)
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+{
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+ if (keynum == UNREVOCABLE_KEY)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ if ((u32)(1 << (ALIGN_REVOC_KEY - keynum)) & rev_flag)
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+ return 1;
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+
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+/* It validates srk_table key lengths.*/
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+static u32 validate_srk_tbl(struct srk_table *tbl, u32 num_entries)
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+{
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+ int i = 0;
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+ for (i = 0; i < num_entries; i++) {
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+ if (!((tbl[i].key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES/4) ||
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+ (tbl[i].key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES/2) ||
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+ (tbl[i].key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
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+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_SRK_ENTRY_KEYLEN;
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+ }
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+#endif
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+
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+/* This function return length of public key.*/
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+static inline u32 get_key_len(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
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+{
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+ return img->key_len;
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Handles the ESBC uboot client header verification failure.
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+ * This function handles all the errors which might occur in the
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+ * parsing and checking of ESBC uboot client header. It will also
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+ * set the error bits in the SEC_MON.
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+ */
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+static void fsl_secboot_header_verification_failure(void)
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+{
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+ struct ccsr_sec_mon_regs *sec_mon_regs = (void *)
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+ (CONFIG_SYS_SEC_MON_ADDR);
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+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
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+ u32 sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
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+
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+ /* 29th bit of OSPR is ITS */
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+ u32 its = sfp_in32(&sfp_regs->ospr) >> 2;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Read the SEC_MON status register
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+ * Read SSM_ST field
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+ */
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+ sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
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+ if ((sts & HPSR_SSM_ST_MASK) == HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST) {
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+ if (its == 1)
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+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
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+ HPSR_SSM_ST_SOFT_FAIL);
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+ else
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+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
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+ HPSR_SSM_ST_NON_SECURE);
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+ }
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+
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+ printf("Generating reset request\n");
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+ do_reset(NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Handles the ESBC uboot client image verification failure.
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+ * This function handles all the errors which might occur in the
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+ * public key hash comparison and signature verification of
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+ * ESBC uboot client image. It will also
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+ * set the error bits in the SEC_MON.
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+ */
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+static void fsl_secboot_image_verification_failure(void)
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+{
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+ struct ccsr_sec_mon_regs *sec_mon_regs = (void *)
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+ (CONFIG_SYS_SEC_MON_ADDR);
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+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
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+ u32 sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
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+
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+ u32 its = sfp_in32(&sfp_regs->ospr) & ITS_MASK >> ITS_BIT;
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Read the SEC_MON status register
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+ * Read SSM_ST field
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+ */
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+ sts = sec_mon_in32(&sec_mon_regs->hp_stat);
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+ if ((sts & HPSR_SSM_ST_MASK) == HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST) {
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+ if (its == 1) {
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+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
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+ HPSR_SSM_ST_SOFT_FAIL);
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+
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+ printf("Generating reset request\n");
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+ do_reset(NULL, 0, 0, NULL);
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+ } else {
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+ change_sec_mon_state(HPSR_SSM_ST_TRUST,
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+ HPSR_SSM_ST_NON_SECURE);
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+ }
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+static void fsl_secboot_bootscript_parse_failure(void)
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+{
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+ fsl_secboot_header_verification_failure();
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Handles the errors in esbc boot.
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+ * This function handles all the errors which might occur in the
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+ * esbc boot phase. It will call the appropriate api to log the
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+ * errors and set the error bits in the SEC_MON.
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+ */
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+void fsl_secboot_handle_error(int error)
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+{
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+ const struct fsl_secboot_errcode *e;
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+
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+ for (e = fsl_secboot_errcodes; e->errcode != ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_MAX;
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+ e++) {
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+ if (e->errcode == error)
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+ printf("ERROR :: %x :: %s\n", error, e->name);
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+ }
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+
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+ switch (error) {
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_BARKER:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IMG_SIZE:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_LEN:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN_NOT_TWICE_SIG_LEN:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_1:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_2:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_KEY_MOD:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG_ESBC_EP:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG_ENTIRES_BAD:
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+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_REVOKED:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_SRK_NUM_ENTRY:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_KEY_NUM:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_SRK_ENTRY_KEYLEN:
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+#endif
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+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
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+ /*@fallthrough@*/
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IE_KEY_REVOKED:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_NUM_ENTRY:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_KEY_NUM:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_IE_ENTRY_KEYLEN:
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+ case ERROR_IE_TABLE_NOT_FOUND:
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+#endif
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+ fsl_secboot_header_verification_failure();
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+ break;
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_RESET:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_JOBQ_STATUS:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_KEY:
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_EM:
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+ fsl_secboot_image_verification_failure();
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+ break;
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_MISSING_BOOTM:
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+ fsl_secboot_bootscript_parse_failure();
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+ break;
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_WRONG_CMD:
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+ default:
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+ branch_to_self();
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+ break;
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+static void fsl_secblk_handle_error(int error)
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+{
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+ switch (error) {
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ:
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+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_ENQ);
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+ break;
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ:
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+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ);
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+ break;
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+ case ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO:
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+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_DEQ_TO);
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+ break;
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+ default:
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+ printf("Job Queue Output status %x\n", error);
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+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_SEC_JOBQ_STATUS);
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+ break;
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+/*
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+ * Calculate hash of key obtained via offset present in ESBC uboot
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+ * client hdr. This function calculates the hash of key which is obtained
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+ * through offset present in ESBC uboot client header.
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+ */
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+static int calc_img_key_hash(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
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+{
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+ struct hash_algo *algo;
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+ void *ctx;
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+ int i, srk = 0;
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+ int ret = 0;
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+ const char *algo_name = "sha256";
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+
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+ /* Calculate hash of the esbc key */
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+ ret = hash_progressive_lookup_algo(algo_name, &algo);
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+ if (ret)
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+ return ret;
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+
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+ ret = algo->hash_init(algo, &ctx);
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+ if (ret)
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+ return ret;
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+
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+ /* Update hash for ESBC key */
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+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
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+ if (check_srk(img)) {
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|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
|
|
|
+ (u8 *)(img->ehdrloc + img->hdr.srk_tbl_off),
|
|
|
+ img->hdr.len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table), 1);
|
|
|
+ srk = 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+ if (!srk)
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
|
|
|
+ img->img_key, img->key_len, 1);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Copy hash at destination buffer */
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_finish(algo, ctx, hash_val, algo->digest_size);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA256_BYTES; i++)
|
|
|
+ img->img_key_hash[i] = hash_val[i];
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Calculate hash of ESBC hdr and ESBC. This function calculates the
|
|
|
+ * single hash of ESBC header and ESBC image. If SG flag is on, all
|
|
|
+ * SG entries are also hashed alongwith the complete SG table.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static int calc_esbchdr_esbc_hash(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct hash_algo *algo;
|
|
|
+ void *ctx;
|
|
|
+ int ret = 0;
|
|
|
+ int key_hash = 0;
|
|
|
+ const char *algo_name = "sha256";
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Calculate the hash of the ESBC */
|
|
|
+ ret = hash_progressive_lookup_algo(algo_name, &algo);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_init(algo, &ctx);
|
|
|
+ /* Copy hash at destination buffer */
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Update hash for CSF Header */
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
|
|
|
+ (u8 *)&img->hdr, sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr), 0);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Update the hash with that of srk table if srk flag is 1
|
|
|
+ * If IE Table is selected, key is not added in the hash
|
|
|
+ * If neither srk table nor IE key table available, add key
|
|
|
+ * from header in the hash calculation
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
|
|
|
+ if (check_srk(img)) {
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
|
|
|
+ (u8 *)(img->ehdrloc + img->hdr.srk_tbl_off),
|
|
|
+ img->hdr.len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table), 0);
|
|
|
+ key_hash = 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
|
|
|
+ if (!key_hash && check_ie(img))
|
|
|
+ key_hash = 1;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+ if (!key_hash)
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
|
|
|
+ img->img_key, img->hdr.key_len, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Update hash for actual Image */
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_update(algo, ctx,
|
|
|
+ (u8 *)img->hdr.pimg, img->hdr.img_size, 1);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Copy hash at destination buffer */
|
|
|
+ ret = algo->hash_finish(algo, ctx, hash_val, algo->digest_size);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Construct encoded hash EM' wrt PKCSv1.5. This function calculates the
|
|
|
+ * pointers for padding, DER value and hash. And finally, constructs EM'
|
|
|
+ * which includes hash of complete CSF header and ESBC image. If SG flag
|
|
|
+ * is on, hash of SG table and entries is also included.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static void construct_img_encoded_hash_second(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * RSA PKCSv1.5 encoding format for encoded message is below
|
|
|
+ * EM = 0x0 || 0x1 || PS || 0x0 || DER || Hash
|
|
|
+ * PS is Padding String
|
|
|
+ * DER is DER value for SHA-256
|
|
|
+ * Hash is SHA-256 hash
|
|
|
+ * *********************************************************
|
|
|
+ * representative points to first byte of EM initially and is
|
|
|
+ * filled with 0x0
|
|
|
+ * representative is incremented by 1 and second byte is filled
|
|
|
+ * with 0x1
|
|
|
+ * padding points to third byte of EM
|
|
|
+ * digest points to full length of EM - 32 bytes
|
|
|
+ * hash_id (DER value) points to 19 bytes before pDigest
|
|
|
+ * separator is one byte which separates padding and DER
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ size_t len;
|
|
|
+ u8 *representative;
|
|
|
+ u8 *padding, *digest;
|
|
|
+ u8 *hash_id, *separator;
|
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ len = (get_key_len(img) / 2) - 1;
|
|
|
+ representative = img->img_encoded_hash_second;
|
|
|
+ representative[0] = 0;
|
|
|
+ representative[1] = 1; /* block type 1 */
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ padding = &representative[2];
|
|
|
+ digest = &representative[1] + len - 32;
|
|
|
+ hash_id = digest - sizeof(hash_identifier);
|
|
|
+ separator = hash_id - 1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* fill padding area pointed by padding with 0xff */
|
|
|
+ memset(padding, 0xff, separator - padding);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* fill byte pointed by separator */
|
|
|
+ *separator = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* fill SHA-256 DER value pointed by HashId */
|
|
|
+ memcpy(hash_id, hash_identifier, sizeof(hash_identifier));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* fill hash pointed by Digest */
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < SHA256_BYTES; i++)
|
|
|
+ digest[i] = hash_val[i];
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+/*
|
|
|
+ * Reads and validates the ESBC client header.
|
|
|
+ * This function reads key and signature from the ESBC client header.
|
|
|
+ * If Scatter/Gather flag is on, lengths and offsets of images
|
|
|
+ * present as SG entries are also read. This function also checks
|
|
|
+ * whether the header is valid or not.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static int read_validate_esbc_client_header(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ char buf[20];
|
|
|
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *hdr = &img->hdr;
|
|
|
+ void *esbc = (u8 *)img->ehdrloc;
|
|
|
+ u8 *k, *s;
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
|
|
|
+ u32 ret;
|
|
|
+ u32 key_num, key_revoc_flag, size;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
|
|
|
+ struct ie_key_info *ie_info;
|
|
|
+ u32 ie_num, ie_revoc_flag, ie_key_len;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+ int key_found = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* check barker code */
|
|
|
+ if (memcmp(hdr->barker, barker_code, ESBC_BARKER_LEN))
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_BARKER;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ sprintf(buf, "%p", hdr->pimg);
|
|
|
+ setenv("img_addr", buf);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!hdr->img_size)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IMG_SIZE;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Key checking*/
|
|
|
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_REVOCATION
|
|
|
+ if (check_srk(img)) {
|
|
|
+ if ((hdr->len_kr.num_srk == 0) ||
|
|
|
+ (hdr->len_kr.num_srk > MAX_KEY_ENTRIES))
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_SRK_NUM_ENTRY;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ key_num = hdr->len_kr.srk_sel;
|
|
|
+ if (key_num == 0 || key_num > hdr->len_kr.num_srk)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_KEY_NUM;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Get revoc key from sfp */
|
|
|
+ key_revoc_flag = get_key_revoc();
|
|
|
+ ret = is_key_revoked(key_num, key_revoc_flag);
|
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_REVOKED;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ size = hdr->len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(&img->srk_tbl, esbc + hdr->srk_tbl_off, size);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = validate_srk_tbl(img->srk_tbl, hdr->len_kr.num_srk);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (ret != 0)
|
|
|
+ return ret;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ img->key_len = img->srk_tbl[key_num - 1].key_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(&img->img_key, &(img->srk_tbl[key_num - 1].pkey),
|
|
|
+ img->key_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ key_found = 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
|
|
|
+ if (!key_found && check_ie(img)) {
|
|
|
+ if (get_ie_info_addr(&img->ie_addr))
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_IE_TABLE_NOT_FOUND;
|
|
|
+ ie_info = (struct ie_key_info *)img->ie_addr;
|
|
|
+ if (ie_info->num_keys == 0 || ie_info->num_keys > 32)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_NUM_ENTRY;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ie_num = hdr->ie_key_sel;
|
|
|
+ if (ie_num == 0 || ie_num > ie_info->num_keys)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INVALID_IE_KEY_NUM;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ie_revoc_flag = ie_info->key_revok;
|
|
|
+ if ((u32)(1 << (ie_num - 1)) & ie_revoc_flag)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_IE_KEY_REVOKED;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ie_key_len = ie_info->ie_key_tbl[ie_num - 1].key_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!((ie_key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 4) ||
|
|
|
+ (ie_key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 2) ||
|
|
|
+ (ie_key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_INV_IE_ENTRY_KEYLEN;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(&img->img_key, &(ie_info->ie_key_tbl[ie_num - 1].pkey),
|
|
|
+ ie_key_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ img->key_len = ie_key_len;
|
|
|
+ key_found = 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (key_found == 0) {
|
|
|
+ /* check key length */
|
|
|
+ if (!((hdr->key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 4) ||
|
|
|
+ (hdr->key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 2) ||
|
|
|
+ (hdr->key_len == 2 * KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(&img->img_key, esbc + hdr->pkey, hdr->key_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ img->key_len = hdr->key_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ key_found = 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* check signaure */
|
|
|
+ if (get_key_len(img) == 2 * hdr->sign_len) {
|
|
|
+ /* check signature length */
|
|
|
+ if (!((hdr->sign_len == KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 4) ||
|
|
|
+ (hdr->sign_len == KEY_SIZE_BYTES / 2) ||
|
|
|
+ (hdr->sign_len == KEY_SIZE_BYTES)))
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_LEN;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_LEN_NOT_TWICE_SIG_LEN;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(&img->img_sign, esbc + hdr->psign, hdr->sign_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* No SG support */
|
|
|
+ if (hdr->sg_flag)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SG;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* modulus most significant bit should be set */
|
|
|
+ k = (u8 *)&img->img_key;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if ((k[0] & 0x80) == 0)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* modulus value should be odd */
|
|
|
+ if ((k[get_key_len(img) / 2 - 1] & 0x1) == 0)
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_KEY_MOD_2;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Check signature value < modulus value */
|
|
|
+ s = (u8 *)&img->img_sign;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!(memcmp(s, k, hdr->sign_len) < 0))
|
|
|
+ return ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HEADER_SIG_KEY_MOD;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return ESBC_VALID_HDR;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+static inline int str2longbe(const char *p, ulong *num)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ char *endptr;
|
|
|
+ ulong tmp;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!p) {
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ tmp = simple_strtoul(p, &endptr, 16);
|
|
|
+ if (sizeof(ulong) == 4)
|
|
|
+ *num = cpu_to_be32(tmp);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ *num = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return *p != '\0' && *endptr == '\0';
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+int fsl_secboot_validate(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
|
|
|
+ char * const argv[])
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ struct ccsr_sfp_regs *sfp_regs = (void *)(CONFIG_SYS_SFP_ADDR);
|
|
|
+ ulong hash[SHA256_BYTES/sizeof(ulong)];
|
|
|
+ char hash_str[NUM_HEX_CHARS + 1];
|
|
|
+ ulong addr = simple_strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 16);
|
|
|
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_priv *img;
|
|
|
+ struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr *hdr;
|
|
|
+ void *esbc;
|
|
|
+ int ret, i, hash_cmd = 0;
|
|
|
+ u32 srk_hash[8];
|
|
|
+ uint32_t key_len;
|
|
|
+ struct key_prop prop;
|
|
|
+#if !defined(USE_HOSTCC)
|
|
|
+ struct udevice *mod_exp_dev;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (argc == 3) {
|
|
|
+ char *cp = argv[2];
|
|
|
+ int i = 0;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (*cp == '0' && *(cp + 1) == 'x')
|
|
|
+ cp += 2;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* The input string expected is in hex, where
|
|
|
+ * each 4 bits would be represented by a hex
|
|
|
+ * sha256 hash is 256 bits long, which would mean
|
|
|
+ * num of characters = 256 / 4
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (strlen(cp) != SHA256_NIBBLES) {
|
|
|
+ printf("%s is not a 256 bits hex string as expected\n",
|
|
|
+ argv[2]);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(hash)/sizeof(ulong); i++) {
|
|
|
+ strncpy(hash_str, cp + (i * NUM_HEX_CHARS),
|
|
|
+ NUM_HEX_CHARS);
|
|
|
+ hash_str[NUM_HEX_CHARS] = '\0';
|
|
|
+ if (!str2longbe(hash_str, &hash[i])) {
|
|
|
+ printf("%s is not a 256 bits hex string ",
|
|
|
+ argv[2]);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hash_cmd = 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ img = malloc(sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (!img)
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memset(img, 0, sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_priv));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ hdr = &img->hdr;
|
|
|
+ img->ehdrloc = addr;
|
|
|
+ esbc = (u8 *)img->ehdrloc;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ memcpy(hdr, esbc, sizeof(struct fsl_secboot_img_hdr));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* read and validate esbc header */
|
|
|
+ ret = read_validate_esbc_client_header(img);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (ret != ESBC_VALID_HDR) {
|
|
|
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ret);
|
|
|
+ goto exit;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* SRKH present in SFP */
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_SRKH_REGS; i++)
|
|
|
+ srk_hash[i] = srk_in32(&sfp_regs->srk_hash[i]);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * Calculate hash of key obtained via offset present in
|
|
|
+ * ESBC uboot client hdr
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ ret = calc_img_key_hash(img);
|
|
|
+ if (ret) {
|
|
|
+ fsl_secblk_handle_error(ret);
|
|
|
+ goto exit;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Compare hash obtained above with SRK hash present in SFP */
|
|
|
+ if (hash_cmd)
|
|
|
+ ret = memcmp(&hash, &img->img_key_hash, SHA256_BYTES);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ ret = memcmp(srk_hash, img->img_key_hash, SHA256_BYTES);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+#if defined(CONFIG_FSL_ISBC_KEY_EXT)
|
|
|
+ if (!hash_cmd && check_ie(img))
|
|
|
+ ret = 0;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (ret != 0) {
|
|
|
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_KEY);
|
|
|
+ goto exit;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = calc_esbchdr_esbc_hash(img);
|
|
|
+ if (ret) {
|
|
|
+ fsl_secblk_handle_error(ret);
|
|
|
+ goto exit;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Construct encoded hash EM' wrt PKCSv1.5 */
|
|
|
+ construct_img_encoded_hash_second(img);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Fill prop structure for public key */
|
|
|
+ memset(&prop, 0, sizeof(struct key_prop));
|
|
|
+ key_len = get_key_len(img) / 2;
|
|
|
+ prop.modulus = img->img_key;
|
|
|
+ prop.public_exponent = img->img_key + key_len;
|
|
|
+ prop.num_bits = key_len * 8;
|
|
|
+ prop.exp_len = key_len;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = uclass_get_device(UCLASS_MOD_EXP, 0, &mod_exp_dev);
|
|
|
+ if (ret) {
|
|
|
+ printf("RSA: Can't find Modular Exp implementation\n");
|
|
|
+ return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ret = rsa_mod_exp(mod_exp_dev, img->img_sign, img->hdr.sign_len,
|
|
|
+ &prop, img->img_encoded_hash);
|
|
|
+ if (ret) {
|
|
|
+ fsl_secblk_handle_error(ret);
|
|
|
+ goto exit;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * compare the encoded messages EM' and EM wrt RSA PKCSv1.5
|
|
|
+ * memcmp returns zero on success
|
|
|
+ * memcmp returns non-zero on failure
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ ret = memcmp(&img->img_encoded_hash_second, &img->img_encoded_hash,
|
|
|
+ img->hdr.sign_len);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (ret) {
|
|
|
+ fsl_secboot_handle_error(ERROR_ESBC_CLIENT_HASH_COMPARE_EM);
|
|
|
+ goto exit;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ printf("esbc_validate command successful\n");
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+exit:
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+}
|
Tom Rini